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The standard expected utility model is augmented by allowing individuals to receive
additional utility in states in which they consider themselves victorious and to lose a utility
increment in which they consider themselves defeated.  The resulting event-dependent
expected utility model is used to explain behavior in games and toward risk.  In games,
players consider themselves defeated when their monetary payoffs are low compared to
their opponents' payoffs, and they consider themselves victorious when their payoffs are
high, but not too high, compared to their opponents' payoffs.  Under these conditions the
model can accommodate behavior that has been interpreted elsewhere as inequity
aversion, as well as cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and in public good provision
games.  In situations of risk, individuals consider themselves victorious (defeated) when
they receive an unlikely, avoidable, high (low) outcome.  Under these conditions the model
can accommodate such behavior as the Allais paradox, boundary effects, and simultaneous
gambling and insurance.
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I am grateful to Robert Slonim and participants at the 1999 Lonestars Conference for
helpful comments, and to the Private Enterprise Research Center for financial support.1 Boundary effects reflect the idea that people behave differently when some
alternatives have different numbers of outcomes than others, as in Neilson (1992) and
Harless and Camerer (1994).
2 There are several related notions of concern for others, such as reciprocity (e.g.
Sugden (1984), Falk and Fischbacher (1999), Croson (1999)), spite (e.g. Saijo and
Nakamura (1995), Levine (1998)), and altruism (e.g. Andreoni (1995), Croson (1999)).
The model proposed here can handle elements of these notions, but only those elements
that coincide with fairness.  Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), and Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) assume that a player’s opponents’ intentions matter, and while intentions could be
incorporated into the model to determine whether the player feels victorious or defeated,
intentions are not considered here.
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1.  Introduction
People like winning and dislike losing, yet this feature has never been incorporated
into the study of games.  This paper remedies that situation.  It is assumed that besides the
utility he receives from his monetary payoff, a player gets a positive utility increment in
situations in which he considers himself victorious, and suffers a negative utility increment
in any situation that he considers a defeat.  Natural notions of victory and defeat in strategic
situations allow the model to accommodate much of the experimental evidence on failures
to behave purely selfishly in games, such as the behavior of responders in the ultimatum
game and proposers in the dictator game, as well as allowing for cooperative equilibria in
the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma and a simple public good provision game.  More
surprisingly, though, notions of victory and defeat can be extended to decisions toward
risk, allowing the model to explain many of the expected utility violations found in the
experimental literature, such as the Allais paradox and boundary effects, as well as
simultaneous gambling and insurance.1  Thus, the paper constructs a single model which
is able to accommodate behavioral patterns from two disparate branches of the literature.
For games, it is natural for a player to feel victorious or defeated based on how his
monetary payoff compares to those of his opponents.  It is assumed that the player suffers
a defeat if his monetary payoff is small compared to his opponents’ monetary payoffs, he
experiences victory if his monetary payoff is large, but not too large, relative to his
opponents’, and experiences neither victory nor defeat otherwise.  This assumption enables
the model to accommodate all of the same behavior as models of fairness or inequity
aversion, as in Bolton (1991), Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000).2  Essentially, if a player’s monetary payoff is either too high relative to2
his opponents’ payoffs to lead to victory or sufficiently low to lead to defeat, he might
prefer a different strategy which reduces his monetary payoff but leads to a more equitable
payoff vector.  By switching strategies, the player gets an extra utility boost by achieving
a victory in the first case or avoiding defeat in the second.
For an individual making a decision toward risk, there are no opponents with
which to compare payoffs, so different notions of victory and defeat are needed.  The
analysis here rests on two key assumptions.  The first is avoidability - if an outcome is to
be considered either a victory or a defeat, the decision-maker must have the opportunity
to make some choice which would avoid that outcome.  If the outcome is avoidable, then
the individual must make a conscious decision not to avoid it.  The second assumption is
that the outcome must be unlikely.  So, the individual experiences victory if his payoff is
high, that payoff is not a sure thing, and he could have made a choice in which that payoff
was impossible.  He suffers a defeat if his payoff is low, it is not a sure thing, and he could
have avoided the low payoff.
The model itself is based on Karni’s (1992) model of event-dependent
preferences.  Events are subsets of the state space, and event-dependent preferences are
similar to state-dependent preferences except that a single state-dependent utility function
is used for all states in a given event.  The model assumes that there are three events,
corresponding to victory, defeat, and neutral outcomes, with the utility function
corresponding to the victory event higher than the neutral utility function, which in turn is
higher than the utility function corresponding to defeat.  Much of the analysis is devoted to
assumptions that determine when a state is considered a victory, a defeat, or neutral.
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 adapts event-dependent preferences
based on Karni (1992) to fit notions of victory and defeat.  Section 3 presents the
assumptions governing when an outcome in a game is considered a victory, a defeat, or
neutral, and shows that these assumptions allow the model to accommodate inequity
aversion in an abstract setting.  Section 4 illustrates how the model can be used to analyze
specific games.  Section 5 looks at behavior toward risk, providing assumptions that
determine whether a state is considered a victory, a defeat, or neutral, and it also supplies
assumptions that guarantee first-order stochastic dominance preference.  Section 6 uses
the model to explain several behavioral patterns that are inconsistent with expected utility.
Sections 4 and 6 also contain comparisons of this model to other, existing models.  While
there are many existing models that can handle some of the evidence discussed in this
paper, there are no other models that fit the evidence on games and the evidence on risk.3 This might be a game against nature, as discussed in Section 5.
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Finally, Section 7 offers some conclusions.  
2.  Event-dependent preferences
In this section, Karni's (1992) model of event-dependent preferences is introduced
and extended to accommodate notions of victory and defeat.  Let S be a state space with
typical element s.  Let E1,...,Ek be a partition of S, so that cEi = S and Ei 1 Ej = i for i
￿ j.  Each Ei is called an event.  Let x: S 6 œ be a payoff function that maps states into
monetary values.  Assume that the set of possible monetary values is bounded, so that
payoffs lie in the interval [x 0,xM].  The individual has preferences over probability
distributions defined over the state space, and the preferences can be represented by the
function Vs, where the subscript distinguishes the preference function from one discussed
later.  Following Karni (1992) the decision-maker is an expected utility maximizer with
event-dependent preferences if there exist functions u1,...,uk such that
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where Fs is a probability distribution defined over states.  Karni (1992) provides an
axiomatic foundation for this model.  The basic difference between event-dependent utility
and state-dependent utility is that event-dependent utility is more restrictive.  Utility can
depend upon the state of the world, but the utility functions must be identical across a
subset of the states.  The set of utility functions is unique up to an increasing affine
transformation, so that Vs and Vs
* represent identical preferences if ui
*(x) = aui(x) + b for
i = 1,...,k where a is a positive scalar and b is a scalar.
For considerations of victory and defeat, it is assumed that there are just three
events, ED, EN, and EV, with corresponding utility functions uD, uN, and uV.  The decision
maker considers himself victorious when a state in EV occurs, he feels defeated when a
state in ED occurs, and he experiences neither victory nor defeat when a state in the neutral
event, EN, occurs.  Whether the individual identifies a state  as a victory, a defeat, or
neutral depends on the nature of the decision task at hand.  In particular, it depends on the
game the individual is playing.3  For example, the player might feel victorious when his4 Crawford (1990) and Chen and Neilson (1999) also analyze monetary games.
5 I depart from the usual convention of using “S” to denote the strategy space
because S denotes the state space.
6 This framework is adapted to fit decisions under risk in Section 5.
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monetary payoff is zero and everyone else's is negative, but the same zero payoff might be
considered a defeat when all other players receive positive payoffs.  To account for this,
it is assumed that the events and their corresponding utility functions depend on the game.
Different games lead to different conceptions of victory and defeat.
Formally, let G denote a monetary game, which includes the list of players, their
strategy spaces, and the monetary payoffs from action combinations.4  Let Ai denote
player i's strategy space.5  Each player i's task is to choose the optimal strategy in Ai given
the strategies chosen by the other players, so that the resulting strategy combination is a
Nash equilibrium.6  A state s is a pure strategy (or action) combination, which determines
the payoffs to the different players, and the probability distribution Fs captures any mixing.
Assume that for each game G there are three events, EV(G), ED(G), and EN(G), and let
uV(·;G), uD(·;G), and uN(·;G) be the corresponding utility functions.  Much of the remainder
of the paper is concerned with how the events and their corresponding utility functions vary
with the game.  The first such assumption is that the neutral utility function uN depends only
on the payoff and not on the game, so that it is unbiased by feelings of victory or defeat.
The preference function, which now depends on the game G as well as the probability
distribution under consideration, becomes
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Preferences that have the representation given in (2) are referred to here as  VD
preferences, and (2) is the VD model.
Two assumptions govern relationships within and between events.  The first states
that the individual most prefers a given monetary payoff when he is victorious and least
prefers it when he is defeated.7 Sarin (2000) introduces monotone evaluation rules for the study of learning in
games.  The evaluation rules used here are different from his because here they must be
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A1 – Ranking of events:  For any combination of s and G such that s 0 EV(G),
uV(x(s);G) > uN(x(s)), and for any combination such that s 0 ED(G),
uN(x(s)) > uD(x(s);G).
Assumption A1 states that in comparison to the neutral event, the outcome x generates
more utility when it is a victory and less utility when it is a defeat.  This assumption,
combined with assumptions about when a state is a victory or a defeat, allows the model
to accommodate a wide variety of behavioral patterns.  The second assumption states
simply that each of the event-dependent utility functions is nondecreasing.
A2 – Monotonicity within events:  For any G, uD(x;G), uN(x), and uV(x;G) are
all nondecreasing in x.
It is assumed throughout the remainder of the paper that conditions A1 and A2 are
satisfied.
3.  Victory and defeat in strategic settings
The analysis begins with strategic situations, in which natural notions of victory and
defeat involve a comparison of the player’s monetary payoff with his opponents’ payoffs.
Three assumptions are used to govern whether a state is considered a victory, a defeat, or
neutral.  To state these, let G be an n-player game and let the state s be a pure strategy
combination defining the state of the world, as above.  Let x(s) be the individual's own
(monetary) payoff when the state is s, as before, and let y(s) be the n-1 vector of the other
player's (monetary) payoffs.  Whether or not a player considers an outcome of the game
a victory or a defeat depends on x(s) and y(s).  However, since x(s) and y(s) have
different dimensions, a further step is needed to compare them.
The function  ?:œm  6  œ is an  evaluation rule if min{y1,...,ym}  #  ?(y)  #
max{y1,...,ym}.  So, an evaluation rule takes a vector and returns a value between the
highest and lowest components of the vector.  The evaluation rule ? is said to be
monotone if ?(y*) $ ?(y) whenever y* $ y component-wise, i.e. yi
* $ yi for i = 1,...,m, so
that when the components of the evaluated vector increase, the evaluation increases.7bounded by the lowest and highest components of the vector being evaluated.
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Examples of monotone evaluation rules are any weighted average with fixed weights and
any order statistic such as the minimum, maximum, or median.
The events in which a player experiences victory or defeat are characterized using
monotone evaluation rules.  The availability of different evaluation rules allows for
considerable flexibility in determining what is a victory and what is a defeat.  For example,
an individual might consider it a victory if his own monetary payoff is above the average
of his opponent's payoffs, and this can be characterized as s 0 EV(G) if x(s) $ ?(y(s)) =
3yi(s)/(n!1).  For a second example, an individual might consider it a victory if his own
monetary payoff is above everyone else's, in which case s 0 EV(G) if x(s) $ ?(y(s)) =
max{y1(s),...,yn!1(s)}.  Finally, a player might consider it a defeat if his is the lowest of the
payoffs, in which case s 0 ED(G) if x(s) # ?(y) = min{y1(s),...,yn!1(s)}.  All of these
examples fit within the structure imposed by the next set of assumptions.
The first assumption governs when a strategy combination is considered a victory
for the player under consideration.
S1 – Minimum victory threshold:  There exists a monotone evaluation rule
?min(y) and a scalar  zmin(G) < 4 such that if s 0 EV(G) then x(s) !
?min(y(s)) $ zmin(G).
This assumption states that for an outcome to be a victory, the player's earnings must
exceed the evaluation of his opponents' earnings by at least zmin.  So, for example, if the
evaluation rule ?min is the average of the opponents' payoffs, for an outcome to be a victory
the player's payoff must be at least as great as the average of his opponents' payoffs.  Note
that zmin could be negative, so that the player does not necessarily need a higher monetary
payoff than his opponents to feel victorious.  Also note that S1 implicitly assumes that the
evaluation rule is independent of the game, so that if the player uses the average of his
opponents' payoffs as the point of comparison in one game, he uses it in all games.
The second assumption governs uneven distributions of payoffs when the
distribution favors the player under consideration.  Assumption S1 states that to be
considered a victory, the individual’s payoff must be high relative to his opponents’
payoffs.  The next assumption states that if the  his payoff is too high relative to his
opponents’ average payoff, he does not feel victorious.7
S2 – Maximum victory threshold:  There exists a monotone evaluation rule
?max(y) and a scalar zmax(G) such that if x(s) ! ?max(y(s)) > zmax(G) then s
0 EN(G).
The assumption posits the existence of a maximal payoff difference above which the
individual no longer feels victorious.  The idea is that a win that is too lopsided is not a
victory, and it could reflect either inequity aversion or feelings of guilt.  Of course, if zmax(G)
is sufficiently large, this effect has no consequence for behavior.
The third assumption deals with defeat.
S3 – Minimum neutral threshold:  There exists a monotone evaluation rule
?D(y) and a scalar zD(G) such that if x(s) ! ?D(y(s)) # zD(G) then s 0
ED(G).
The idea behind this assumption is straightforward – if the player's payoff is too low
compared to his opponents' payoffs, he considers it a defeat.
Assumptions S1 – S3 identify three, possibly different monotone evaluation rules
for determining events.  This allows for quite a bit of flexibility in modeling behavior, and
the identification of the evaluation rules is an interesting question for further study.  Most
of the experimental evidence in the next section concerns two-person games, in which case
there is a unique evaluation rule, ?(y) = y.  For games with more than two players, other
evaluation rules are possible.  For example, a player might use the minimum for ?D, the
average for ?min, and the maximum for ? max.  Under these conditions the player feels
defeated if his own payoff is too far below the lowest of his opponents' payoffs, and he
feels victorious if his own payoff compares favorably to the average of his opponents'
payoffs but is not too high compared to the highest of his opponents' payoffs.
There are good reasons for assuming that all three evaluation rules are the same.
First, as noted above, when there is only one opponent there is only one evaluation rule.
Second, other studies of players' concern for others use only one evaluation rule.  Notably,
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) use a comparison of the
player's own payoff to the average of his opponents' payoffs in their models of inequity8 In Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model players care about the difference between
their payoffs and the average of their opponents' payoffs, while in Bolton and Ockenfels'
(2000) model players care about the ratio.
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aversion.8  The first lemma shows how the setting is simplified when the same evaluation
rule is used for all three thresholds.
Lemma 1.  If ?D = ?min = ?max = ? and if zD(G) # zmin(G) # zmax(G) then
ED(G) = {s| x(s) ! ?(y(s)) # zD(G)},
EV(G) = {s| zmin(G) # x(s) ! ?(y(s)) # zmax(G)}, and
EN(G) = {s| zD(G) < x(s) ! ?(y(s)) < zmin(G)} c {s| x(s) ! ?(y(s)) > zmax(G)}.
According to Lemma 1, if the difference between a player's own payoff x(s) and his
evaluation of the vector of his opponents' payoffs ?(y(s)) is low, the player feels defeated,
and when it is high but not too high he fells victorious.  There are two reasons why an
outcome might be considered neutral.  First, it could be that zD < x(s) ! ?(y(s)) < zmin, so
that the individual's payoff is too high to be considered a defeat but too low to be
considered a victory.  Second, it could be that x(s) ! ?(y(s)) > zmax, so that the individual's
payoff is too high compared to his opponents' payoffs.  Note that these too-high payoffs
can result in a neutral state, but not a defeat.
One notion of concern for others that has garnered increasing attention over the
years is fairness or inequity aversion (see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000)).  Basing their arguments on experimental evidence from ultimatum and
other games, researchers have posited that players’ preferences exhibit inequity aversion
in the sense that they sometimes choose strategies that reduce their own monetary payoffs
but result in more equitable monetary allocations across players.  It can be shown that if
VD preferences satisfy assumptions S1 - S3 they are consistent with inequity aversion.
Not all games provide an opportunity for players to exhibit inequity   Let G be a
game, let Ai denote player i’s strategy set, let x(ai, a!i) denote the monetary payoff of
player i when he plays strategy ai and his opponents play the strategy vector a!i, and let
y(ai, a!i) denote the vector of monetary payoffs received by his opponents under the same9
strategy combination.  Given the evaluation rule ?(y), define z(ai, a!i) = x(ai, a!i) !?(y(ai,
a!i)).  Let (G, ?, a!i) be a triple consisting of a game, a monotone evaluation rule, and a
strategy vector for player i’s opponents.  





**, a!i) $ x(ai, a!i) for all ai 0 Ai, and
(ii)  |z(ai
**, a!i)| < |z(ai
*, a!i)|.
The idea behind this definition is that given the game and his opponents’ strategies, the
player under consideration has two strategies of interest.  Strategy ai
** is the best response
in purely monetary terms, while ai
* pays less in monetary terms but results in less inequity
as measured by the payoff difference z.  In such a setting, it is possible for player i to
choose ai
* over ai
**, thereby trading some amount of money for decreased inequity.  If so,
he exhibits inequity aversion.
Definition.  A class of preferences accommodates inequity aversion if for any triple (G,
?, a!i) that potentially reveals inequity aversion for player iand any pair of strategies ai
**
and ai
* satisfying (i) and (ii) above, there exists a member of that class of preferences for
which ai
* is chosen over ai
**.
Note that the class of standard, selfish preferences cannot accommodate inequity aversion,
because purely selfish players always choose the selfish best-response strategy ai
**.  As
the next proposition shows, the class of VD preferences can accommodate inequity
aversion.
Proposition 1.  The class of VD preferences that satisfies S1 - S3 accommodates inequity
aversion.
Proof.  Suppose that (G, ?, a!i) potentially reveals inequity aversion, and let ai
**
and ai
* be as in the definition.  It suffices to find the threshold levels zD(G), zmin(G) and
zmax(G), as in Lemma 1, that lead to a preference for ai
* over ai
**.  Assume first that
z(ai
**,a!i) < z(ai
*,a!i).  If z(ai
**,a!i) # zD(G) < z(ai
*,a!i) < zmin(G), then playing ai
** results
in a defeat but playing ai
* results in a neutral outcome.  If uD(x(ai
**,a!i)) # uN(x(ai
*,a!i)),9 Analyzing the behavior of the proposer in ultimatum games involves analyzing
responses to beliefs about the behavior of the responder, which moves beyond the main
point of this paper.
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player i chooses ai
* in response to a!i.
Now assume instead that  z(ai
**,a!i) > z(ai
*,a!i).  Set zmin(G) # z(ai
*,a!i) # zmzx(G)
< z(ai
**,a!i).  Playing ai
* results in a victory while playing ai
** results in a neutral outcome.
If uV(x(ai
*,a!i)) # uN(x(ai
**,a!i)), player i chooses ai
* in response to a!i. 9
The VD model accommodates inequity aversion through a different mechanism
than most models, such as those proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000).  In those models opponents’ payoffs enter directly into the player’s
utility function, and a small increase in the opponents’ payoffs has a small effect on the
player’s utility.  Here, in contrast, opponents’ payoffs only matter for determining the
events.  A small increase in the opponents’ payoffs can either lead to a different event,
thereby causing a large change in utility, or it can lead to the same effect, in which case
there is no change in utility.  Thus, The VD model treats opponents’ payoffs much more
discretely than existing models.
4.  Behavior in some common games
The model of behavior in games constructed in the preceding sections is able to
explain patterns of play observed in a variety of settings, including the behavior of the
proposer in dictator games, the responder in ultimatum games,9 players in a one-shot
prisoner’s dilemma, and players in a public good contribution game.  Of course, the first
two of these games potentially reveal inequity aversion, so the results follow from
Proposition 1.  Nevertheless, the analysis illustrates the usefulness of the VD model in
games.
Dictator game
In the dictator game, proposer is assigned the task of splitting a prize of size k.  Let
x denote the amount he keeps for himself, so that he gives k ! x to his opponent.  While
standard game-theoretic analysis predicts that x = k, experimental studies show that
proposer tends to give away about 20% of the pot, consistent with x = 0.8k.
Proposer gives away money if two things happen.  First, keeping the entire pot of10 Since there are only two players, the only evaluation rule is ?(y) = y, where y
is the opponent's monetary payoff.
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k must be inconsistent with victory.  This occurs if zmax < k.10  If, in addition, zmax > 0, it is
possible for proposer to feel victorious and the highest monetary payoff consistent with the
victory is (zmax + k)/2.  When this offer is made, the other player gets (k ! zmax)/2 and the
payoff difference is zmax.  For proposer to be willing to give away part of the pot, uN(k),
the neutral utility from keeping k, must be below uV((zmax + k)/2), the victory utility of
keeping the smaller amount (zmax + k)/2.  Thus, two conditions are required for proposer
to give away a positive amount of money in the dictator game, as seen in the following
proposition, whose proof is obvious.
Proposition 2. In the dictator game, proposer keeps an amount x < k if  0 < zmax < k and
uV((zmax + k)/2) $ uN(k).
The basic idea behind this result is that the proposer considers it a victory if he earns a
higher payoff than the responder, as long as it is not too much higher.  If his payoff is too
high, he no longer considers it a victory, and so he keeps the largest amount consistent with
victory.
Note that proposer's generosity is governed entirely by the parameter zmax, and that
experimental evidence that proposer gives away 20% of the pot is consistent with zmax =
0.6k.
Ultimatum game
In the ultimatum game, proposer is assigned the task of splitting a prize of size k.
He offers to give x to responder and keep k ! x for himself.  Responder can either accept
the offer or reject it.  If she accepts, the payoffs are as proposed.  If she rejects, both
players get zero.  From responder's point of view, accepting leads to z1 = 2x ! k, while
rejecting leads to z2 = 0.  Experiments show that responders often reject offers of less than
about 20% of the pot.
Unlike the proposer's decision in the dictator game, the behavior of the responder
in the ultimatum game is driven by the parameter zD, which reflects the  (negative) payoff
difference below which the individual feels defeated.  The next proposition shows that in
the VD model responders reject offers that are too low.12
Proposition 3.  In the ultimatum game, if !k < zD < 0 < zmin responder rejects an offer of
x if and only if x # (k + zD)/2 and uD(x) < uN(0).
Proof.  By hypothesis, rejecting an offer leads to a neutral outcome for responder.
So, utility from rejecting is uN(0).  First suppose that x # (k + zD)/2 and uD(x) < uN(0).
The first inequality guarantees that z = x ! 2k # zD, so that responder feels defeated if she
accepts.  The second inequality states that accepting the offer generates less utility than
rejecting it does, so she rejects the offer.
Now suppose that one of the two inequalities fails.  If x > (k + zD)/2, responder
does not experience defeat when she rejects the offer, and uN(x) > uN(0).If, instead, x is
considered a defeat but uD(x) $ uN(0), she does not reject the offer of x, regardless of
whether it is considered neutral or a defeat, because accepting leads to higher utility. 9
The basic idea behind this result is that responder considers it a defeat if her earnings are
too far below proposer's earnings, while she considers the rejection outcome to be neutral.
If she finds the zero monetary payoff in a neutral setting more attractive than the offered
payoff in a defeat setting, she rejects the offer.
Proposition 3 implies that if zD < 0, responder accepts any offer of k/2 or more.
Also, if zD # !k, responder accepts any positive offer.  Experimental evidence that
responder rejects offers of about 0.2k or less is consistent with zD = !0.6k.
Prisoner's dilemma
Consider the following version of the prisoner's dilemma.
C D
C 3, 3 0, 4
D 4, 0 2, 2
Standard game-theoretic analysis prescribes that both players choose the dominant
strategy D, and this is the unique equilibrium.  The VD model allows other equilibria as
well.  In particular, under appropriate conditions there exists a Nash equilibrium in which
both players play C.
Proposition 4.  If, for both players, zmin # 0 < zmax < 4 and uV(3) $ uN(4), then the13
strategy combination (C,C) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof.  Since zmin # 0 < zmax, both on-diagonal outcomes are considered victories
by both players.  Since zmax < 4, the off-diagonal outcomes are considered neutral by the
player with the higher monetary payoff.  If his opponent plays C, a player receives utility
uV(3) from playing C and utility uN(4) from playing D, and, by the hypothesis, prefers to
play C. 9
The basic idea behind this result is that the players consider it a victory if they both get the
same payoff, but not if one player gets a much larger payoff than the other.  While
defecting has a higher monetary payoff than cooperating when the opponent cooperates,
the extra utility from feeling victorious is enough to compensate and remove any incentive
for defecting.
The requirements for cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma as presented above
and the requirements for contributions in the dictator game are remarkably consistent.  In
the dictator game the maximal payoff difference is k, and behavior is consistent with zmax
= 0.6k.  In the prisoner’s dilemma the maximal payoff difference is k = 5, and when zmax
= 0.6k there is an equilibrium in which both players cooperate.
Public good provision
Suppose that n individuals are endowed with some amount e > 0, and each player
i can split his endowment between consumption ai and contributions bi to a public good.
Letting b = 3bi, each individual receives benefit gb from the public good, regardless of his
own contribution, with g < 1 < ng.  Thus, his total “monetary” payoff is ai + gb.  Since g
< 1, in the unique Nash equilibrium each individual contributes bi = 0.  But, if every player
contributed some positive amount, they would all be better off.  This is the standard free-
riding problem.
The VD model provides a way around this free-riding problem.  In particular,
under appropriate parameter conditions there exist other Nash equilibria besides the free-
riding equilibrium.
Proposition 5.  If all players are identical with  zmax = 0, then for every 0 # ß # e such that
uV(e ! ß + ngß) $ uN(e + (n !1)gß) there exists a Nash equilibrium in which every player
contributes ß.
Proof.  Suppose the other n ! 1 players each contribute ß.  This means that all of11 Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), and Bolton and Ockenfels (1999) all assume that
inequity aversion depends not only on the payoff allocation, but also on the intentions of
the other players.  This added consideration could be incorporated into the VD model, but
is not here.
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the other players receive identical payoffs, so that all monotone evaluation rules for the
player under consideration yield the same evaluation of his opponents' payoffs.  If the
player under consideration contributes ß, all n players have the same monetary payoff of
e ! ß + ngß.  If, instead, he contributes b < ß, his monetary payoff is e ! b + (n !1)gß
+ gb and the other n ! 1 players each get e ! ß + (n !1)gß + gb.  Thus, when he
contributes ß, z = 0 and he considers it a victory, but when he contributes less than ß, z >
0 and he considers the outcome neutral.  His highest possible neutral payoff, given that all
of the other players contribute ß, is e + (n !1)gß, which corresponds to a contribution of
zero.  By the hypothesis, he prefers to contribute ß. 9
As with the dictator game, all of the action in the public good provision game is
determined by the parameter zmax, which demarks a payoff-difference threshold below
which the player considers himself victorious but above which he considers the outcome
neutral.  In the public good game with identical players, contributions occur in Nash
equilibrium when players have an extremely strong notion of fairness so that they only
consider themselves victorious if they have contributed at least as much to the public good
as the average player.
Discussion
A number of other models of preferences in games can explain this same evidence.
Bolton (1991), Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Bolton and Ockenfels
(1999), all construct models in which individuals dislike inequitable allocations.11  Here
these notions are captured by the parameters zD and zmax.  When a player earns less than
zD below his opponents' average earnings, he feels defeated.  This effect makes strategies
which can yield neutral outcomes more appealing, and these neutral outcomes must have
more equitable allocations.  When a player earns zmax above his opponents' average
earnings, he considers himself victorious, but if he earns more than  zmax above his
opponents' average earnings, he considers the outcome neutral.  This effect makes
strategies that generate more equitable allocations more appealing.  The major difference
between the VD model and the existing models of fairness or inequity aversion is that in the12 Spite is closely related to negative reciprocity.  See ...
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existing models payoff differences enter directly into the player's utility function, with
players willing to trade small decreases in their own payoffs for small decreases in payoff
differences.  In the VD model, in contrast, payoff differences enter the utility function more
discretely.
Sugden (1984), Croson (1999), and Falk and Fischbacher (1999) consider
notions of reciprocity.  Positive reciprocity entails rewarding kindness, while negative
reciprocity means punishing unkindness.12  In the VD model, negative reciprocity is
governed by the parameter zD.  If a player's opponent plays a strategy which helps the
opponent at his expense, causing the payoff difference to fall below zD, strategies that hurt
the opponent but make the payoffs more equal become more attractive.  A good example
is the propensity of responders to reject low offers in the ultimatum game, as discussed
above.  Positive reciprocity can be discussed using the prisoner's dilemma.  If his opponent
cooperates, putting himself at risk, if zmax is too high the player under consideration does
not find it attractive to defect, since this would punish his opponent's kind action.  Thus, the
VD model builds in tastes for reciprocal behavior, but only through tastes for inequity
aversion.
5.  Victory and defeat in risky choice
In this section the event-dependent preferences discussed in Section 2 are used
to incorporate notions of victory and defeat into expected utility theory.  Since the VD
model was originally developed in the context of games against other players, it is
necessary to transform the model to allow for games against nature.  In these settings, only
the payoff the individual receives and the set of payoffs he might have received determine
the events.  The remainder of this section is devoted to placing restrictions on the events
and the utility functions, and these restrictions are then used in the next section to discuss
evidence on risky decisions.
Let S denote a state space with typical element s, as before, and let x(s) be the
payoff the individual receives from his choice when the state of the world is s.  Let FS be
a probability distribution over states, and let A be the individual’s choice set, that is, the
set of probability distributions among which the individual chooses.  For considerations of
risky decisions, the choice set A replaces the game G in specifications of the events and the
event-dependent utility functions.16
The first restriction on preferences states simply that if a given state is considered
a victory, any state that yields a higher payoff is also considered a victory.  Similarly, if a
state is considered a defeat, any state that yields a lower payoff is also a defeat.
R1 ! Monotonicity across events:  If s 0 EV(A) and x(s') $ x(s) then s' 0
EV(A), and if s 0 ED(A) and x(s') # x(s) then s' 0 ED(A).
Besides being plausible, assumption R1 allows events to be characterized as payoff
intervals.
Proposition 6.  If condition R1 holds, there exist payoffs xD(A) and xV(A) such that ED(A)
= {s| x(s) # xD(A)}, EN(A) = {s| xD(A) < x(s) < xV(A)}, and EV(A) = {s| xV(A) # x(s)}.
Proof.  Let xD(A) = sup{x(s)| s 0 ED(A)}.  Then by R1, ED(A) = {s| x(s) #
xD(A)}.  Similarly, let xV(A) = inf{x(s)| s 0 EV(A)}.  Then by R1, EV(A) = {s| x(s) $
xD(A)}.  Since xD(A) 0 x(ED(A)), xV(A) 0 x(EV(A)), and ED(A) and EV(A) are disjoint,
it must be the case that xD(A) < xV(A).  Then EN(A) = {s| xD(A) < x(s) < xV(A)}. 9
Let F(x) be the probability distribution over payoffs induced by the distribution
function Fs(s) defined over states.  Since both events and probability distributions can be
defined in terms of payoffs instead of states, the preference function Vs can be, as well.
Let
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where x0 and xm are the lowest and highest possible payoffs, respectively, and the events
and utility functions are assumed to depend on the choice set, as in (2).  By construction,
V(F*) $ V(F) if and only if  Vs(Fs
*) $ Vs(Fs) where F* and F are the probability
distributions over payoffs induced by the probability distributions over states, Fs
* and Fs,
respectively.  Thus, V represents the individual's preferences.  For the remainder of the
discussion of preferences toward risk, states will be ignored and events will be treated as
payoff intervals.17
Now define u(x;A) = ui(x;A) on Ei(A).  Then V(F;A) = Iu(x;A)dF(x), which is
a standard expected utility representation, albeit with a complicated utility function, and all
of the standard results from expected utility theory can be extended to this setting.  Most
importantly, results about first-order-stochastic dominance (FOSD) preferences can be
established under conditions A1 and A2 in Section 2, which state that uV(x;A) $ uN(x) $
uD(x;A) for all x and A and that ui(x;A) is increasing in x for all A, respectively.
Proposition 7.  Under conditions R1, A1, and A2, preferences exhibit FOSD preference.
Proof.  Under R1, it is enough to show that the function u(x) is increasing.
Suppose that x* > x.  There are two cases.  First, if both x* and x are in the same event
Ei, then A2 implies that u(x*;A) = ui(x*;A) $ ui(x;A) = u(x;A).  Alternatively, if x 0 Ei(A)
and x* 0 Ej(A) with i ￿ j, then A1 and A2 together imply that u(x*;A) = uj(x*;A) $ ui(x;A)
= u(x;A). 9
This proposition states that if the conditions A1, A2, and R1 hold, the decision-maker will
only choose from among the undominated alternatives in A, where F 0 A is undominated
in A if there is no F' 0 A such that F' FOSD F.
Now turn attention to the issue of determining when a payoff constitutes either a
victory or a defeat.  First, for an outcome to be considered either a victory or a defeat, it
must have resulted from a purposeful choice; an inevitable outcome does not lead to the
extra utility boost.  This leads to the next assumption.
R2 ! Avoidability:  Payoffs in EV(A) and ED(A) must be avoidable; that
is, given A, there exists an undominated distribution F in A such
that F(xD(A)) = 0, and there exists an undominated distribution F*
in A such that F(xV(A)) = 1.
Take the defeat case first.  Defeats occur when the decision-maker suffers a low outcome.
But, if there was nothing he could have done to avoid this outcome, the outcome is not
considered a defeat.  Put another way, defeats cannot be caused by bad luck; instead, they
must result, at least in part, from a conscious decision.  So, the defeat occurs when the
decision-maker suffers a low outcome after choosing not to take a “safe” option which
would have made the low outcome impossible.
The reasoning for victories is similar.  A victory occurs when the decision-maker18
obtains a high payoff, but a high-payoff alone is not sufficient.  To feel victorious, the
decision-maker must have passed up a safe option which would have precluded the high
outcome.
The other restriction on preferences is that victories and defeats must be unlikely:
R3 ! Unlikeliness:  Payoffs in EV(A) and ED(A) must be unlikely; that
is, there exist pD(A), pV(A) 0 (0,1) such that for all undominated
F 0 A, F(xD(A)) # pD(A) and F(xV(A)) $ 1 ! pV(A), with pD(A)
+ pV(A) < 1.
If someone plays a lottery in which he can win $1000 with probability 0.99 and win  $0
otherwise, winning $1000 is unlikely to make him feel victorious.  But, winning $0 is likely
to make him feel defeated.  Condition R4 places bounds on how likely victories and
defeats can be, with the provision that some payoffs must be considered neutral.
Conditions R2 and R3 combined state that if a payoff x is considered a victory by
the decision maker, there must be some undominated probability distribution in the choice
set for which the highest payoff is less than x, so that x is avoidable, and there must be no
undominated probability distribution in the choice set for which the probability of receiving
at least x is greater than pV, so that x is unlikely.  If the payoff y is considered a defeat,
there must be some undominated probability distribution for which the lowest payoff is
above y, so that y is avoidable, and there must be no undominated probability distribution
for which the probability of receiving y or less is greater than pD, so that y is unlikely.
The final assumption concerns the shapes of the utility functions.  The neutral utility
function uN, which is independent of the choice set, is assumed to be S-shaped as in
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), so that it is risk averse over gains and risk seeking over
losses.
R4 ! Diminishing sensitivity.   uN(x) is concave when x > 0 and convex when
x < 0, and uN(0) = 0.
The resulting utility function is shown in Figure 1.  Assumption R4 holds particular
importance for the issue of gambling and insurance in the next section.  In particular,
without victory and defeat considerations, an expected utility maximizer satisfying R4










6.  Evidence on risky choice
In this section it is demonstrated that the VD model is able to accommodate
several important choice patterns that have been discussed in the literature.  In particular,
the discussion includes the Allais paradox, Conlisk's (1989) variants of the Allais paradox
including boundary effects, and simultaneous gambling and insurance.
Table 1
Probabilities
Choice set=A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
Payoff F1





$5M 0 .10 0 .10 .88 .98 .10 .20 .10 .20
$1M 1 .89 .11 0 .11 0 .89 .78 .19 .08
$0 0 .01 .89 .90 .01 .02 .01 .02 .71 .72
Asterisks denote the modal choices in the pairs.
The Allais paradox
The Allais paradox involves the two pairs of choices A1 and A2 in Table 1.  It13 Similar conditions could be found if $5M is considered neutral in one or both of
the choice pairs.  The key to the result lies in treating $0 as a defeat in A1 but as neutral in
A2.
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arises because individuals typically prefer F1 to F2 in A1, but prefer F4 to F3 in A2, and this
choice pattern is inconsistent with standard expected utility specifications.  The VD model
can accommodate the Allais pattern.  First, note that when the choice set is A1 = {F1, F2},
the outcome $0 can be considered a defeat, because it is both avoidable and unlikely.  The
payoff $5M may or may not be considered a victory.  To make F2 as attractive as
possible, $5M will be treated as a victory when the choice set is A1.  Thus, the individual
chooses F1 over F2 iff
uN($1M) $ .01uD($0; A1) + .89uN($1M) + .10uV($5M; A1), (4)
assuming that $5M is considered a victory.  When the choice set is A2 = {F3, F4}, $0 is
no longer avoidable, so it cannot be considered a defeat.  The outcome $5M is both
avoidable and unlikely, while the outcome $1M is not avoidable.  Thus, $1M is neutral,
while $5M may or may not be a victory.  To make F3 as attractive as possible, $5M is
treated as neutral when the choice set is A2.  The decision maker chooses F4 over F3 iff
.90uN($0) + .10uN($5M) $ .89uN($0) + .11uN($1M). (5)
Simplifying and combining (5) and (6), the individual chooses F1 and F4 if13
.01uD($0; A1) + .10uV($5M; A1) # .11uN($1M) # .01uN($0) + .10uN($5M). (6)
The intuition behind (6) fits exactly that originally given by Allais (1953) to explain
his paradox.  In the choice between F1 and F2, the former is chosen because receiving $0
would be very bad.  This is captured by $0 being considered a defeat in the left side of the
expression.  In the choice between F3 and F4, the decision maker will probably get $0
anyway, so he might as well choose F4 and go for the $5M.  This is captured by $0 being
considered neutral in the right side of the expression.
Conlisk's displaced Allais paradox14 When there are three fixed outcomes, the set of lotteries with those three
outcomes is the two-dimensional simplex given by {(p1,p2,p3) 0 œ+
3| p1 + p2 + p3 = 1}.
This is the probability triangle.  The boundary is the set where at least one of the three
probabilities is zero.  Consequently, the distributions F1, F3, F4, G1, and G2 in Table 1 all
lie on the boundary of the probability triangle.
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Conlisk (1989) considers two variants of the Allais questions.  The first variant
consists of having subjects choose between F1 and F2 in choice set A1 in Table 1, and also
between G1 and G2 in choice set A3.  The first choice is governed by expression (4)
above.  In the second choice neither of the extreme outcomes is avoidable, so the neutral
utility function is used for all of the outcomes.  Conlisk finds that a majority of subjects
prefer G2 to G1, which is implied by
0.98uN($5M) + 0.02uN($0) $ 0.88uN($5M) + 0.11uN($1M) + 0.01uN($0). (7)
This reduces to 0.10uN($5M) + 0.01uN($0) $ 0.11uN($1M), which also implies the choice
of F4 over F3 in (5).  So, condition (6) above implies Conlisk’s displaced Allais behavior
as well as the original Allais behavior.
Boundary effects
The distributions in A1, A2, and A3 in Table 1 all lie along the boundary of the
probability triangle.14  Conlisk (1989) also gave subjects choices that moved the original
Allais distributions off of the boundary.  Notice that the movement from H1 to H2 is the
same as the movement from F1 to F2 in the Allais paradox, removing mass 0.11 from the
intermediate outcome and adding mass 0.10 to the high outcome and mass 0.01 to the low
outcome.  Similarly, the movement from H3 to H4 is the same as the movement from F3 to
F4 in the Allais paradox.
The choices in this problem differ from the Allais choices in an important
dimension, though.  In none of the alternatives is the individual able to avoid any of the
outcomes; all of the probabilities are strictly positive.  Since none of the outcomes are
avoidable, the neutral utility function uN is used for all of the outcomes, and the individual
must choose either H1 and H3 or he must choose H2 and H4.  This is what Conlisk (1989)
finds, with 66 of the 215 subjects choosing H1 and H3, and 81 choosing H2 and H4.  So,
68% of the subjects’ choices were consistent with the VD model.  Once again assuming
that uN is independent of the choice set, the modal choice, H2 and H4, is implied by the22
condition 0.10uN($5M) + 0.01uN($0) $ 0.11uN($1M), which is identical to the condition
(5) for choosing F4 over F3 and condition (7) for choosing G2 over G1.
An ability to predict the choices of F1 over F2 but H2 over H1 is important.
Typically this choice pattern has been labeled a “certainty” or “boundary” effect, and in
their meta-study Harless and Camerer (1994) conclude from the evidence of boundary
effects that expected utility works well when the number of outcomes with positive
probability is constant, but not when the number of probable outcomes changes.  While
the VD model does not make exactly this prediction, it comes close.  As the next
proposition shows, the VD model coincides with the standard expected utility model when
all distributions under consideration have the same support, but that Allais-type violations
can occur when distributions have different supports, as with the Allais paradox.
Proposition 8.  Let A1 = {F1, F1
*} and A2 = {F2, F2
*}, with F1 ! F1
* = F2 ! F2
* and
supp F1 f supp F1
* and supp F2 f supp F2
*.  Then all VD preference maximizers choose
either F1 and F2 or F1
* and F2
* if and only if supp F1 = supp F1
* and supp F2 = supp F2
*.
Proof.  Suppose that supp F1 = supp F1
* and supp F2 = supp F2
*.  Then no
outcomes are avoidable, and the utility function uN is used to evaluate all monetary payoffs.
Then F1 ￿ F1
* if and only if 0 # IuN(x)[dF1(x) ! dF1
*(x)] = IuN(x)[dF2(x) ! dF2
*(x)]
if and only if F2 ￿ F2
*.
Now suppose that supp F1 ￿ supp F1
*.  There are two cases.  First suppose that
inf supp F1 > inf supp F1
*.  Then choose  inf supp F1
* < xD(A1) # inf supp F1 and pD(A1)
= F1
*(xD(A1)).  Also let xD(A2) < inf supp F2
*, xV(A1) > sup supp F1
*, and xV(A2) > sup
supp F2
*.  Then the individual uses uN to evaluate all monetary payoffs in A2, and uses uN
for all monetary payoffs above xD(A1) in A1.  He uses uD(·;A1) for all monetary payoffs
below xD(A1) in A1, and these payoffs only occur if he chooses F1
*.  If uD(x;A1) is
sufficiently below uN(x) for x # xD(A1), it is possible to have F1 ￿ F1
* but F2
* ￿ F2.
The other case has inf supp F1 = inf supp F1
* but sup supp F1 < sup supp F1
*.  A
similar argument shows that it is possible for the individual to experience victory from F1
*
but not from the other three lotteries, and have the preferences F1
* ￿ F1 but F2 ￿ F2
*.9
This proposition shows that Allais-type violations occur when one of the two lotteries in
a pair has a different support than its alternative.  It also shows that Allais-type violations
are not caused by any sort of certainty effect – if the $1M for sure gamble in the original
Allais lottery were replaced by a uniform distribution over [$0.95M, $1.05M], the VD23
model predicts the same choice pattern.
Insurance and gambling
Begin with a simple insurance problem in which the individual faces the prospect
of losing L > 0 with probability p.  Fair insurance against the loss costs pL.  The issue is
under what conditions does the individual prefer paying pL for sure over facing the
potential loss.  Let (x,p) denote the probability distribution which pays x with probability
p and zero otherwise.  The choice set A = {(!L,p), (!pL, 1)}, so there are only two
choices.  Note that the loss of L is avoidable, and so is the payoff of zero.  If p # pD, then
using (3), the individual purchases insurance if and only if
uN(!pL) $ puD(!L;A). (8)
The standard reference dependence condition R4 tells us that uN(!pL) < puN(!L), so that
without the effect of defeat the individual would not buy insurance.  But, since uD(!L;A)
< uN(!L), it is possible for (8) to hold if uN(!L) ! uD(!L;A) is sufficiently large.
Proposition 9.  If !L # xD(A) and if uN(!pD(A)L) $ pD(A)uD(!L;A), there exists q #
pD(A) such that the individual insures when p 0 [q, pD(A)].
Proof.  If p # pD(A), then the expected utility from facing the risk is puD(!L;A)
and the expected utility from insuring is uN(!pL).  The hypothesis states that the individual
insures when p = pD(A).  If p < pD(A) and uN(!pL) $ puD(!L;A), then note that
d/dp[uN(!pL) ! puD(!L;A)] = !LuN'(!pL) ! uD(!L;A) $ !LuN'(!pL) ! uN(!pL)/p =
!L[uN'(!pL) ! uN(!pL)/(!pL)], and the term in brackets is negative by the convexity of
uN over losses.  So, if the individual insures when the probability of loss is q, he insures
whenever q # p # pD(A). 9
This result shows that it is possible for the model to accommodate insurance against losses
if the loss is large enough and unlikely enough to constitute a defeat, and if the effect of a
defeat on utility is sufficiently large.  Note that individuals only insure when losses are
unlikely.
A similar analysis allows for gambling over large, unlikely gains.  Here the condition
is that the probability of the gain G must be at most pV(A) and the other condition is that
pV(A)uV(G;A) $ uN(pV(A)G).15Luce et al. (1993) develop a model that uses threshold levels for gains and losses
with these reference levels dependent on the choice set.  The model can accommodate the




There are, of course, many models of behavior toward risk that can accommodate
the choice patterns discussed above, and there are models that share many of the elements
used in the construction of the VD model.  However, none of the models look explicitly
at notions of victory and defeat, and none of the models have counterparts which can be
used to address the game theory evidence.
The VD model handles expected utility violations through event-dependent
preferences.  Currently, the most prominent existing models are rank-dependent expected
utility theory (e.g. Quiggin (1993)) and the closely-related cumulative prospect theory
(Tversky and Kahneman (1992)).  Both of these models rely on probability transformation
schemes to explain expected utility violations, while the VD model leaves probability
distributions untransformed.  There are similarities, though.  Most of the action from
probability transformations comes in the tails of the distributions, and all of the action from
the victory and defeat events comes in the tails of the distributions.  Still, in the existing
models the probability transformations are based only on the distribution under
consideration, while in the VD model the events are based on the choice set.  Rank-
dependent expected utility theory and cumulative prospect theory are both able to
accommodate the Allais paradox as well as simultaneous gambling and insurance, but
unless the probability transformation function is discontinuous at its endpoints, they cannot
accommodate boundary effects.
Several other models do not use probability transformations, and they are closer
to the VD model.15  Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) propose a model in which the utility
function is segmented, as here, and it predicts that people will gamble on large, unlikely
gains and insure against large, unlikely losses.  To accomplish this, they propose the
condition that the utility function is star-shaped, i.e. it exhibits nonincreasing average utility
with respect to some anchor point.  The event-dependent utility function of the VD model
is not star-shaped, because it is convex over losses.
Conlisk (1993) constructs a model in which the decision-maker has a preference
for gambling.  In his model, the riskier of two choices generates additional utility, and he
shows that it can explain the Allais paradox and simultaneous gambling and insurance.  His16 There are also models in which the parameters of the utility function depend on
the lottery being considered, rather than the choice set.  See, for example, Becker and
Sarin (1987).
17 The notion of disappointment discussed here differs from Gul's (1991) notion
of disappointment aversion, which can be described as a preference for avoiding the risky
gamble in situations like the first Allais choice pair.
18 See Humphrey (1998) and Schmidt (1998) for extensions.
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model is close to the VD model, in that both augment utility according to something other
than the monetary payoff, and this augmentation depends on characteristics of the choice
set.16  But, this preference for gambling has no obvious application to the games discussed
here.
The two categories of models that are closest to the VD model are those with
dissapointment17 and elation (Loomes and Sugden (1986) and Bell (1988)) and those
constructed to accommodate boundary effects (Cohen (1992), Neilson (1992)).  Using
the terminology from this paper, one can think of the former class of models, which are
similar in nature to regret theory (Loomes and Sugden (1982), Bell (1982)), as beginning
with a neutral utility function, and adding utility from elation when the monetary payoff is
above the certainty equivalent computed using the neutral utility function, and subtracting
disutility from disappointment when the monetary payoff is below the certainty equivalent.
This leads to two events, with the neutral event missing, and the overall utility function is
continuous, unlike the one depicted in Figure 1.  While this model can accommodate many
behavioral patterns, it cannot explain boundary effects.
A variety of models have been proposed to accommodate boundary effects.  The
original version of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979) could accommodate
boundary effects through the discontinuity of the probability weighting function.  Neilson
(1992) proposes a model with discontinuous utility functions where different utility functions
are used for different probability distributions depending on how many outcomes are
assigned positive probability.18  Neither of these models exhibits stochastic dominance
preference, while the VD model does.
The closest model to the VD model for analyzing behavior toward risk is the three-
criteria model of Cohen (1992).  There the individual compares the expected utility of
different distributions, but different utility functions are used for different distributions based19 Gilboa (1988) and Jaffray (1988) propose similar models but using only the
lowest possible payoff (the security level) and not the highest possible payoff (the potential
level).
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on the highest and lowest payoffs available from the distribution.19  Proposition 8 above
shows that in the VD model, expected utility with a single, event-independent utility
function works well only when all lotteries under consideration have the same support,
which matches exactly the prediction of Cohen's model.  However, the likelihood of the
outcomes never enters into Cohen's model.
7.  Conclusions
This paper presents a single model that can explain “anomalous” behavior in games
and toward risk.  In particular, it can accommodate evidence of inequity aversion,
cooperation in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma, and contributions in a free-riding setting.
It can also accommodate the Allais paradox and its variations, boundary effects, and
simultaneous gambling and insurance.  The success of a single, unified model for fitting this
wide variety of patterns suggests that it may not be necessary to use separate approaches
for games and for risk, and that it is fruitful to explore models that can do both.  The
success also validates the interpretation of the evidence lent by the model.
According to the VD model proposed here, the propensity of responders to reject
low offers in ultimatum games and the Allais paradox behavior both arise from the same
underlying motivation – both arise because the individual wishes to avoid states in which
they feel defeated.  For the ultimatum game, this means avoiding states in which his
opponent’s payoff is too high compared to his own.  For the Allais behavior, this means
avoiding states in which an avoidable, unlikely, low payoff occurs.  If, as the model
proposes, individuals do lose utility in states in which they feel defeated, then one should
expect them to take actions to avoid this utility loss, and these actions manifest themselves
in predictable patterns in a variety of settings, including both risk and games.
Inequity aversion is captured through two effects.  First, when the player’s payoff
is low relative to his opponents’, he can avoid defeat by reducing his own payoff but
reducing his opponents’ payoffs by more.  Second, the player feels victorious when his
payoff is high relative to his opponents’ but not too high, and if his payoff is too high he can
retain victory by reducing his own payoff and raising his opponents’.  Thus, inequity
aversion comes not from a natural sense of fairness, but instead from a combination of a27
dislike of losing and a sense of guilt for winning by too much.
Gambling and insurance arise through two effects as well.  Individuals have the
standard reference-dependent neutral utility function introduced by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), so that it is concave over gains and convex over losses.  Without some other
consideration, then, individuals would never insure against large, unlikely losses and they
would never gamble on large, unlikely gains.  But they do in the VD model.  Insurance
against large, unlikely losses occurs because people consider themselves defeated when
they suffer a large, unlikely loss, and insure against this sense of defeat.  Gambling on large,
unlikely gains occurs because people consider themselves victorious when they win a large,
unlikely prize, and they gamble on this sense of victory.  This willingness to gamble on
victory suggests that players in games might choose riskier strategies in an effort to achieve
a victory, although no games in which this effect can occur are explored in this paper.28
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